Kuhn (1970) summarises his objections to the Popperian position in his first contribution to Lakatos and Musgrave (1970), pointing out that they do have certain areas of agreement. Kuhn's objections to Popperian falsificationism His 'replies' are contained in his two contributions to Lakatos and Musgrave (1970), the Appendix to the second edition of Structures of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1970) and his 'Second Thoughts' (Kuhn 19-). His subsequent contributions to the sociology and philosophy of knowledge have largely been amendments of this position in response to critiques.
In his Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 1962b) he expounded the basic principles of his thesis of the production of scientific knowledge. Kuhn prefaced the exposition of his model in his discussion of the Copernican Revolution (Kuhn, 1957a) and in his paper on dogma in science (Kuhn 1961a). It has very strong conventionalist elements, but emphasises the developmental nature of the progress of science. Kuhn's model evolves from a critique of Popperian falsificationism. In the main, such usage will revert to Kuhn's own usage, rather than adaptations of it, although this is no easy matter as Kuhn shifted his position on what he labelled a paradigm. The reference to 'paradigm' in the literature is, therefore, confusing and the usage in this account will be made clear. However, despite the frequent references to Kuhn's usage, much of the adoption of the term, particularly in sociology, is a far cry from Kuhn's concept. This widespread adoption makes the analysis of the concept important for any metascientific endeavour. It has had a substantial impact on the sociology of knowledge and the philosophy of science, and the term paradigm has been incorporated into social science and philosophy extensively since its re-emergence in Kuhn's work, particularly his Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962b). The paradigmatic model of the production of scientific knowledge derives from the work of Thomas Kuhn.
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